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CONFLICT OF LA'Y']S
A. J. Santoro

Final Examination

May 15, 1973

Please read the entire examination Hith care before starting to \vrite.
Please ~.;r:i-ite legibly and on one side of the paper. If you feel that an
essential element of fact is not stated, make and expressly state an
appropriate assumption and anSvler the question both with and without
the assumption. Discuss all issues fairly raised \vhether or not
dispos itive of the case.
1.

5 Points (9 l1inutes)

On November 10, 1970, John, a lifelong resident of liassachusetts, married
l1ary, a life long resident of Rhode Island. Immediately after the marriage,
the couple Hent to live in John's summer cottage on Cape Cod Hhile t-laiting
for the completion of a permanent residence in Boston. Before the house was
completed, ho\V'ever, John was drafted into the Army and Hary '-lent to live with
her ~V'idotV'ed mother in Cranston, Rhode Island.
Sometime during June, 1971, Nary was advised by her physician to move to
a warmer climate for her health. She communicated this to John, who wrote
ins i sting that Hary move to Hiami Hhere they could make their home after his
discharge. Accordingly, Nary and her mother moved to Hiami on August 10, 1971
and took up residence in a condominium mmed by Hary's mother. Hary also
arranged for the sale of the nou completed Boston house.
On April 28, 1973, John ~as mustered out of the service at Fort Dix,
New Jersey and promptly started for Florida. He arrived at his mother-in
law's residence on May 1, 1973, and there remained until he purchased a home
in Fort Lauderdale some three '-1eeks later.
The Florida legislature had recently passed a statute providing for a
$1,000 bonus to Viet Nam veterans (as John was) Hho \V'ere domiciled in Florida
on or before January 1, 1973. The bonus was an attempt by the state
legislature to provide compensation for the disruption to families caused
by the 'var.
John seeks your advice as to Hhether or not he is entitled to the bonus.

II.

5 Points (9 minutes)

Vitali, a national of Italy, came to the United States in 1969 on a
temporary visitors visa which t-1as valid for six months plus extensions.
At various intervals after his arrival in the U. S. he applied for and
received extensions. The condition for obtaining the extensions \V'as that
he Sign a statement reciting his foreign residence as Rome, that he was
admitted for a temporary period and that he was in possession of a return
ticket to Italy.
During his stay in the United States, Vi tali commenced operations as
a treaty trader, married and purchased a home in Perth Amboy, Nev7 Jersey.
He frequently applied for, but was denied, a permanent visa.
A treaty trader is defined as : "An alien entitled to enter the United
States under and in pursua~ce of the provisions of a treaty of commerce and
navigation be~veen the United States and the foreign state of which he is a
national solely to develop and direct the operations of an enterprise in
which he has invested. 11
There is, hotvever, no such treaty beaveen Italy and the United States.
Vitali held himself out as a treaty trader because of a gratuitous notation
on his temporary visa \-Jhich reads as fo11oy1S: "Hr. Vitali would be eligible
for a permanent visa if the appropriate treaty bea.;reen the United States and
Italy ~'lere in effect. lsi John A. Marino American Vice-Consul."

- 1 -

Vitali has continued his stay in the U. S. for some four years pursuing
his trading operations.
In 1972 he sought a divorce from his \V'ife and alth ough he could prove
sufficient grounds for divorce, the court dismissed the proceedings because
of lack of jurisdiction. Vitali wa..'1ts you to advise him as to whether or not
an appeal would be desirable.
III.

20 Points (36 Hinutes)

Sam and Laura ,,,ere married in 1950 and lived in the state of Net.;r York
from 1950 until 1962 . Sam has been employed by the Federal Immigration Service
since 1949. In 1962, he was transferred to Boston . Hassachusetts and lived
there until 1966 when he lIas transferred to Baltimore, Haryland. At government expense, h e , his ~;l ife and children moved to Baltimore , Naryland, where
they lived from 1966 to 1970 .
In 1970, Laura and the children went to New York, at the insistence of
Sam, so that the children could visit ''lith Sam's dying mother and so Laura
could be of some comfort during the mother ' s last days. Sam paid the fare
and continuously sent money to Laura for herfs and the children's support.
Some months later his mother died and he went to New York for the funeral.
At that time, Sam informed Laura that they ";.;rere evicted from their residence
in Baltimore, that he had no suitable replacement and that he would send for
them when he found housing.
Unable to find housing, Laura and the children remained in New York and
Sam sold some of their Baltimore furniture. The balance of the furniture tvas
sent to New York and placed in storage .
At about the same time, Sam t,Yas temporarily transferred to Atlanta,
Georgia, and because of this , suggested that Laura and the children continue
to remain in Nevi York. Prior to his trip to Atlanta, Sam had purchased a
trailer and stationed it at a trailer camp in Baltimore, but shortly before
his Atlanta trip he took the trailer to Alexandria, Virginia, parked it in
a parking lot and commuted to Baltimore from Alexandria.

On May 20, 1971, Sam obtained a divorce in Alexandria based on his
Virginia domicile and on June 30 s 1971 he married , at Potomac, Haryland, his
present wife whom he had met and became enamored of ~vhile his family \-I'as
residing in Ne1V' York.
At this point, Laura becomes suspicious of his insistence that she stay
in New York and she and the children ll.'1expectedly returned to Naryland in
August 1971. After a fe\.;r days Sam told Laura of his divorce in Virginia.
Laura returned to Nell York 1;vhere she ins tituted divorce proceedings. Pursuant
to statute, Sam tV'as served in Naryland. The statute provided that where the
complaint demands judgment in divorce, service may be made outside the state
on a defendant domiciled in New York. This service has been held by New York
to give the court personal jurisdiction over the party served.
The New York court granted Laura a divorce on the grounds of adultery~
set aside the divorce decree in favor of Sam of the Virginia court, and awarded
Laura alimony of $1,200.00 per year. The N. Y. statute under which the
alimony was awarded reads as follovs:
Il v
Jhere the husband in an action for divorce, separation, annulment,
or declaration of nullity of a void marriage, or a person other than the
husband when an action for an annulment is maintained after the death of
the husband, makes default in paying any sum of money as required by
the judgment or order directing the payment thereof, the court in its
discretion may make an order directing the entry of judgment for the
amount of such arrears, or for such part thereof as justice requires ,
having a regard to the circumstances of the respective parties, together
,,11th ten dollars costs and disbursements. The application for such order
shall be upon such notice to the husband or other person as the court
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may direct •. Such judgment may be enforced by execution or in any other
manner prov1ded by law for the collection of money judgments. The relief
herein provided for is in addition to any and every other remedy to v1hich
the wife may be entitled under the law; provided that ,",'hen a judgment
for such arrears or any part thereof shall have been entered pursuant to
this section , such judgment shall thereafter not be subject to modification
under the discretionary pm'l er granted by this section ; and after the entry
of such judgment the judgment creditor shall not thereafter be entitled
to collect by any form of remedy any greater portion of such arrears than
that represented by the judgment so entered. I I
During the early part of 1973, Laura and the child moved to 'Hassachusetts
as did Sam and his new wife. Laura brought an action in Hassachusetts for
$2,000.00 in alimony arrearages .
Discuss all possible defenses and decide the case of Laura v. Sam.

IV.

5 Points (9 Hinutes)

Plaintiff, a resident of Florida , sued defendant who is a resident of
New York in a State court of Florida for damages for negligently causing him
to be personally injured in a Florida accident. Hhen defendant failed to
appear or contest the suit, plaintiff 'vas a~varded damages by a jury and
judgment was entered in Florida for damages and costs. The judgment was not
paid and plaintiff brought the present suit thereon in Ne,'1 York. Plaintiff
alleged that after the entry of judgment in Florida the defendant had filed a
special appearance in the Florida Trial Court challenging the jurisdiction
of that court over the defendant . Plaintiff asked the court to vacate the
judgment but the cour t refused finding that service had in fact been made on
defendant in Florida as certified by the local Sheriff. Defendant appealed
this decision but the Appellate Court affirmed the refusal to vacate and the
Supreme Court of Florida denied defendant's petition for a writ of certionari.
Plaintiff asked for a summary judgment \-lhich ~.,as denied by the Special
term but granted by the Appellate Division. The case is nm-7 before the Court
of Appeals. Decide the case.

V.

10 Points (18 Uinutes)

On June 10, 1971, Bob purchased a Cadillac from Automobile, Inc. and
executed a note and chattel mortgage on the car to Automobile to secure the
IIDpaid balance of the purchase price. On the same day, Automobile assigned
the note and mort g age to Credi t, Inc.
The mortgage provided inter alia that Bob would not remove the car from
New York ..lithout the ,vritten consent of Credit. At all times the parties to
these transactions resided or did business only in New York. Contrary to the
provisions of the mortgage, Bob took t h e car to Florida and on September 17,
1971 the car tvas used to unlawfully transport heroin with the consent of Bob.
The car \'las seized by Florida authorities pursuant to statute.
Proceedings were started by Florida for the forfeiture of the car. pursuant
to § 100 of the Health and Safety Code of Florida which reads as follows: "A
vehicle used to unlawfully transport or facilitate the unlawful transportation
of any narcotic, or in which any narcotic is unlawfully possessed by an
occupant thereof shall be forfeited to the state. II
An exception to forfeiture is made in favor of a lien claimant under 5101
of the Health and Safety Code which reads as follows : u the claimant of any
right, title or interest in the vehicle may prove his lien, mortgage, or
conditional sales contract to be bona fide and that his right, title, or
interest was created after a reasonable investigation of the moral responsibility ,
character, and reputation of the purchaser, and wi thout any knmdedge that the

- 3 -

vehicle was being, or uas to be, used for the purpose charged. 11 Credit admits
that it made no investigation of Bob because not required to under Neu York lffiv.
The clear purpose of the forfeiture, as articulated by the Florida
legislature, lvas to keep cars and of the possession of those v;rho might use them
for the transportation of narcotics.
The judgment rendered by the court provided for the sale of the Cadillac
and the proceeds forfeited to the State of Florida subject to a lien of $2000
payable to Credit.
The State appeals the decision saying the lm-ler court
erred in recognizin g the lien. The state maintains that the public policy of
Florida is to enforce its penal statutes and that the civil la\;r of NeH York
could have no extra-territorial effect to defeat the penal law of Florida.
Hrite the appellate opinion.

VI.

15 Poin t s

(27 Hinutes)

Bill and Sue '!.Jere married in :n assachusetts in 1969. Soon after the
marriage, it became apparent that t h ey Here simply incompatible so they separated. John remained in Eassachusetts and Sue took up residence in Ne,v York.
Some months later they met in California vlhile both Here on vacation.
Realizing t~ at they ne v er finally diso1ved the marriage they decided to get
divorced in California under a statute "lhich authorized the g ranting of
divorces if both the husband and the ,vife are subject to the jurisdiction of
the court.
The Cali f ornia court p roceeded to grant the divorce based on Ne\v York
lau T,lhich permits incompatibility as a ground for divorce even though both
Hassachusetts and California permit divorces only on the grounds of adultery.
Shortly after t h e d ivorce , Bill and Sue married Jane and Hichael respectively. 1';0\., the s tate of Ne\" York is ins tituting a b i gamy prosecution against
Sue.
In the meantime, Bill 's ne~7 wife, Jane, died and her brother now claims
that since Bill vIas not properly divorced , he 17as not validly Married to Jane
and therefore not entitled to share in Jane's estate and that he, the brother,
is Jane ' s sole heir.

VII.

(1)

Decide the case of NeVY York v. Sue

(2)

Decide the case of In Re Jane ' s Estate

10 Points (1 8 Hinutes )

Several years ago Ja1'1es and Carol "Tere divorced in Haine vThich vas their
domicile at the time. The divorce decre e purported to finally establish and
fix James i support oblig ation to James , Jr., t h e only issue of the marriage.
FolloYing the divorce Carol and the child moved to Alabama and James moved to
Texas.
James Jr . has managed to d issipate the support money due to some extraordinary medicine and educational expenses.
In vieu of this, James Jr.
through a guardian brough t suit for additional support in Texas. James
answered by setting up the Haine decree as a bar.
l'lay James Jr. recover for additional support?
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Explain your ansvTer.

VIII.

30 Points

(54 !linutes)

On Jooe 22, 1972, Plaintiff, a resident of Uaryland Has driving on a
Haryland road about five miles from the District of Columbis line, v]hen a
speeding automobile, returning to the District, rapidly approached him from
the rear, collided ~vith the left portion of his car, veered across the road
and come to res t in a ditch. Plaintiff vias severely injured.

Upon the arrival of the police, it was discovered that the driver of the
car causing the accident had abandoned said car. The owner of the abandoned
car was traced through its District tags to defendant, a resident of the
District of Columbia.
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant in Haryland based upon a
statute which provides for personal Jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries of
Naryland '''-lho commit a tortious act vlithin the state, except as to a cause
of action for defamation of character arising from the act, or commits a
tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within
the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising
from the act. II Service on the defendant was made as prescribed by statute
and was proper.
Defendant maintains that he \las nct the driver of the auto at the time
of the accident and that, in fact, the auto had been stolen near the \.Jhite
House prior to the accident. He admits hotvever that a set of keys was
inadvertantly left in the back seat of the auto, in full view of passers~by.
Both Naryland and the District have the fol10\17ing statute:
No person driving, or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to
stand unattended ~Yithout first stopping the engine, locking the ignition,
removing the key, and effectively setting the brake thereon and, t7hen
standing upon any grade, turning the front wheels to the curb or side of
the hi glnvay •
Both jurisdictions have articulated the purposes behind their statutes.
The District maintains that the purpose of the statute is to prevent strangers
from tampering 1;' lith or stealing cars and injuring others. The statute is
designed to promote the safety of the public in the streets. Unlocked cars
create a risk that meddling by children, theives or others will result in
injuries to the public and the statute discourages this by placing the burden
of the risk, as far as it may be, upon those who create it. The District also
cited statistics indicating that 40% of autos stolen in the District are
involved in accidents. Horeover, 85% of the thieves do not possess an operator's
permit and that in 42% of the thefts ~ keys yJere left in the cars.
Haryland maintains that its statute is designed to prevent theft, tampering
Hith a car, or the starting of a car under its own momentum if the brakes should
slip.
Under District law, violation of the statute is negligence ~ ~ v7hereas
under Haryland law it is not.
In fact under District law its courts have stated:
"Since it is a safety measure, the violation of the statute is negligence.
This negligence created the hazard and thereby brought about the harm ~\Thich
the statute was intended to prevent. It was therefore a legal or
"proximate l l cause of the harm. Both negligence and causation are too
clear in these circumstances, '-1e think, for submission to a jury.~'
Haryland courts, on the other hand, have stated that Hthe statute creates
a duty of safety to the public, but this duty is limited to the immediate
vicinity of the parking place and a thief , an independant intervening cause,
is the proximate cause of the accident and not the mroer ~vhose negligence is
remote. II
(1) Decide the case of Plaintiff v. Defendant by utilizing a preBabcock
methodology.
(2) Hrite a majority and one or more dissenting opinions by utilizing a
methodology that derives from the Babcock decision.
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